Accounting standards and value relevance of accounting information: a comparative analysis between Islamic, conventional and hybrid banks by Agbodjo, Serge et al.
1 
 
Accounting Standards and Value Relevance of Accounting Information: A 
Comparative Analysis between Islamic, Conventional and Hybrid Banks 
 
Serge AGBODJO 














Purpose: The study investigates the value relevance of accounting information for Islamic, 
conventional and hybrid banks. It also investigates the moderation impact of IFRS adoption and 
AAOIFI mandatory adoption on value relevance of accounting information. 
Design/methodology/approach: Using value relevance models, we run panel data regressions 
on 47 Islamic banks, 112 conventional banks and 42 hybrid banks (conventional banks with Islamic 
windows). Our study covers listed banks from 14 countries over the period 2010-2018.  
Findings: Our paper offers three empirical evidences. First, we find that value relevance of 
accounting information is higher for Islamic banks, compared to conventional banks. Second, we 
find that IFRS framework strengthens the relevance of accounting information in Islamic banks, 
but we did not find the same for Hybrid banks. Third, we find that the mandatory adoption of 
AAOIFI accounting standards has a moderation effect on value relevance of accounting 
information for both Islamic banks and Hybrid banks. The robustness analysis shows that there is 
a significant contribution of compliance with Islamic Finance rules in IBs and HBs, which 
substantially reduces managers' opportunistic behavior to manage accounting information. 
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Practical implications: The study is useful for investors that consider the Islamic ethical 
practices to make their investment decisions as well as for the standards-setting bodies that focus 
on establishing accounting standards for the Islamic banking industry.  
Originality/value: We contribute to value relevance literature by providing novel evidence on 
the value relevance in fully-fledged Islamic, fully-fledged conventional and Hybrid Banks.  We 
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The Islamic banking sector with its economic significance is an attractive industry for investors 
seeking for ethical investment opportunities. The success of Islamic banking has been boosted 
further when multinational and conventional banks began providing Islamic products and Islamic 
windows. Despite their specificities with regards to the strict moral constraints that shape the 
particular context of their business model, banks offering Islamic financial services and products 
remain financial intermediaries that carry out financial transactions and listing on financial 
markets. They have to attract investors and raise funds to guarantee their continuity and survival. 
Similar to all actors in the capital markets, IBs are required to disclose accounting and financial 
information that investors need for investment decision purposes. For the IASB (2008) conceptual 
framework, the fundamental qualitative characteristics of accounting information are the relevance 
and the faithful representation. The relevance assumes that “financial information is capable of 
making a difference in the decisions made by users. Information may be capable of making a 
difference in a decision even if some users choose not to take advantage of it or already are aware 
of it from other sources”(IASB, 2010, p17). “To be a perfectly faithful representation, a depiction 
would have three characteristics. It would be complete, neutral, and free from error. Of course, 
perfection is seldom, if ever, achievable. The Board’s objective is to maximize those qualities to 
the extent possible” (Ibid, 2010, p.17).  
Value relevance studies examine how stock market react to accounting information (Ball and 
Brown, 1968). They assume that  accounting information is relevant  if it provides additional 
information to investors (Feltham and Ohlson, 1995; Ohlson, 1995; Collins et al., 1997). Previous 
studies on value relevance of accounting information focused on non-financial firms (see Amir et 
al., 1993; Harris et al., 1994; Collins et al., 1997; Fields et al., 1998; Dhaliwal et al., 1999; 
Dumontier and Raffournier, 1999; Martinez, 2004; Lenormand and Touchais, 2009; Keener, 2011). 
Much attention is given in accounting literature to bank’s value relevance (Dimitropoulos et al., 
2010; Agostino et al., 2011; Anandarajan et al., 2011; Manganaris et al., 2016; Burke and Wieland, 
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2017). Prior research focuses on conventional banks (hereafter, CBs) without addressing the 
differences with banks operating under Islamic finance principles.  
Islamic banks (hereafter, IBs) are a unique context to study the contribution of religious and 
ethical dimension on accounting reliability, more particularly Islamic ethical dimension. IBs are 
considered as having ethical identity, since the foundation of their business philosophy is closely 
tied to religion (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Nienhaus, 2011). IBs follow particular ethical principles 
making them distinctive, such as the profit and loss sharing, the ban on dealing with interest, the 
tangibility and traceability of money, the transparency requirement, the ban on speculation and 
high risk-taking, and the requirement for investing funds in socially responsible assets. Conformity 
with the Islamic finance ethics in the field of financial management leads to innovative forms of 
bank business models and various governance frameworks compared with conventional banks. A 
Shariah supervisory board (Hereafter, SSB) ensures the conformity of IBs’ activities with the 
Islamic finance ethics. Shariah supervision by SSBs is highly required among the overall 
governance system in order to protect stakeholder’s interests, outside investors included, toward 
Shariah compliance (Almutairi and Quttainah, 2017; Farag et al., 2017; Basiruddin and Ahmed, 
2019).  
IBs present relevant features that could enhance the relevance of accounting information 
encouraging outside investors to place confidence in IBs financial reports in order to make 
investment decisions. To the best of our knowledge,  the study of Kadri (2016) is a first attempt to 
analyse value relevance of accounting information in IBs. Kadri (2016) examines the value 
relevance of book value and earnings of 11 Malaysian Islamic and 9 conventional banks from 1998 
to 2012. Kadri (2016) shows that, although book value and earnings of IBs and CBs are relevant, 
those of IBs remain low compared to CBs. Our research extends and goes beyond Kadri's (2016) 
in two important ways. First, we explore the value relevance of accounting information for an 
international sample of banks offering conventional and Islamic financial services. Second, we 
investigate the moderating role of accounting standards on value relevance of accounting. 
 
Indeed, the objective of our research is to empirically examine the relevance of the 
accounting information, notably the earnings and book value per share, disclosed by IBs in 
comparison with CBs. First, we examine the value relevance of accounting information disclosed 
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by IBs, CBs and Hybrid banks1 (hereafter, HBs). Second, we investigate the moderation role of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions standards (AAOIFI) on the value relevance of accounting 
information.   
 
Using a sample of 201 banks categorised into 47 IBs, 112 CBs and 42 HBs from 14 
countries over the period 2010-2018, our analysis reveals three main results. Firstly, we provide 
evidence that the value relevance of accounting numbers is higher for IBs and HBs, compared to 
CBs. Secondly, we find that IFRS strengthens the relevance of accounting numbers in IBs but no 
moderation effect of IFRS on value relevance is detected for HBs. Thirdly, we find that the 
adoption of mandatory AAOIFI accounting standards has a moderation effect on value relevance 
of accounting numbers in IBs and HBs.  
 
Our study offers several contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge, we provide new 
cross-country empirical evidence on the value relevance of accounting information for IBs, CBs 
and HBs. We also provide new evidence on the moderating role of accounting standards on the 
value relevance of accounting information in the banking industry.    
 
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 reviews the literature and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 2 discusses the research design. Section 3 presents and discusses 
the empirical results. Section 4 highlights the robustness analysis and section 5 concludes. 
 
1. Literature review and development of hypotheses 
 
1.1.Value relevance of accounting information 
 
Ball and Brown (1968) is a pioneer study on the value relevance of accounting information. 
Information is considered value relevant if stock price movements are associated with the release 
                                                            
1 We follow the classification of (Mohamed et al., 2020) of banks. Hybrid banks are conventional banks with Islamic 
windows.  An Islamic window is a separate department within a conventional bank operating under strict surveillance 




of such information. Holthausen and Watts (2001) distinguish three types of research on Value 
relevance that associate accounting information with the market value of equities, including 
relative association studies. The latter measures the relation between share market value and 
different measures of earnings (see Amir et al., 1993; Harris et al., 1994; Collins et al., 1997; Fields 
et al., 1998; Dhaliwal et al., 1999; Dumontier and Raffournier, 1999; Martinez, 2004; Lenormand 
and Touchais, 2009; Keener, 2011). The relevance of accounting information is often assessed by 
the coefficient of determination R² (Collins et al., 1997). The higher the values of R², the greater 
the explanatory power of the accounting numbers. According to Dumontier and Raffournier (2002), 
globally, most studies on value relevance use the net income as accounting number with relatively 
low obtained values of R² (R squared). For example in Europe, they are 10% in the United 
Kingdom, 7% to 17% in Germany, 1% to 29% in Denmark, and 1% to 49% in France (Dumontier 
and Raffournier, 2002). To improve the explanatory power of the models, different ways were 
considered which involve the implementation of non-linear relations between market value and 
accounting numbers (Martinez, 2004; Ahmad, 2006), the consideration of longer study periods (see 
Collins et al., 1997) or the use of panel data regressions (Collins et al., 1997; Dumontier and 
Labelle, 1998). Prior studies examined value relevance in financial markets of developed countries 
(see Dumontier and Labelle (1998) for the French context and Collins et al. (1997) for US context). 
Studies have been also extended to study value relevance in emerging markets (see Alali and Foote 
(2012) for Abu Dhabi; Al-Hares et al. (2012) for Kuwait; Qu and Zang (2015) for China and Lee 
and Lee (2013) for Taiwan). 
 
Empirical studies on bank’s value relevance are less abundant. Most previous studies 
exclude financial firms due to the special nature of their financial services, and focus on non-
financial firms. Differences in international accounting standards also make it difficult to evaluate 
bank financial statements across different countries (Anandarajan et al., 2011). Research on value 
relevance in banks focused on the value relevance of derivative disclosure information in banks 
under specific accounting standards (Barth et al., 1996; Eccher et al., 1996; Nelson, 1996; 
Venkatachalam, 1996). Nelson (1996) evaluates the association between the market value of banks' 
common equity and the fair value estimates disclosed under the Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards SFAF No.107 of the largest US banks (146 banks in 1992 and 133 banks in 1993) for 
the period 1992-1993. The results suggest that only the reported fair values of investment securities 
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have incremental explanatory power relative to book value. However, the study does not provide 
reliable evidence of incremental explanatory power for the fair value disclosures of loans, deposits 
and long-term debts. For the same period, Eccher et al. (1996) examine the value relevance of fair 
value data disclosed under SFAS No. 107 on 293 banks during 1992 and 319 banks during 1993. 
Their results suggest that differences between fair and book values of financial instruments are 
associated with market-to-book ratios. However, fair value disclosures for financial instruments 
other than securities are value relevant only in limited settings. In contrast with Eccher et al. (1996) 
and Nelson (1996), Barth et al. (1996) find incremental explanatory power for loan fair values on 
sampled banks close to that used in Nelson's research (1996). With the same idea, Venkatachalam 
(1996) investigates the value relevance of banks' derivatives disclosure provided under the SFAS 
No.119 and finds that fair value disclosure for derivatives helps explaining cross-sectional 
differences in bank stock prices. 
 
Added to the latter studies on value relevance of financial instruments held by banks before 
and after the introduction of new financial accounting standards, studies have considered the 
relevance of bank accounting information as a whole (Abuzayed et al., 2009; Dimitropoulos et al., 
2010; Agostino et al., 2011; Anandarajan et al., 2011; Manganaris et al., 2015, 2016; Burke and 
Wieland, 2017). i.e. Abuzayed et al. (2009) show a value relevance of the net income in Jordanian 
banks over the period 1993-2004. They also find that the components of net income are more 
important than the aggregate net income in explaining bank value in the Jordanian Stock Exchange. 
Dimitropoulos et al. (2010) examine the informational quality of annual accounting earnings within 
Greek banking institutions over the period 1995-2004 and find that earnings have higher 
incremental importance in explaining stock return movements compared to cash flows. 
Anandarajan et al. (2011) find that book value of equity and earnings have value relevance with 
respect to equity valuation on a sample of 813 banks from 38 countries for the period 1993-1994. 
The authors also find that value relevance in banks is significantly affected by the transparency and 
the level of financial information disclosure requirements in the countries considered as well as the 
legal environment. At the bank-specific level, the authors reveal that the organizational form and 
the risk level have the most important impact on bank value relevance. 
With regards to IBs, we find, to the best of our knowledge, only Kadri (2016) investigates 
the value relevance of book value and earnings in one IB (compared with six CBs), listed in Bursa 
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Malaysia for the period 1998-2012. Kadri (2016) shows that the book value and earnings of 
Malaysian banks are value relevant. The author also observes that the book value and earnings of 
IBs and CBs are value relevant when they are separated. The author also finds that the explanatory 
power towards market value provided by IBs (with R² = 6.3 %) is far behind CBs (with R² = 69.2 
%). We complement this study by providing a cross-country evidence on the value relevance on 
accounting information in the banking sector (IBs, CBs, and HBs).and the moderating role of 
accounting standards. 
 
1.2. Value relevance of accounting information in IBs 
 
IBs present relevant features that could enhance accounting reliability encouraging outside 
investors to place confidence in IB financial reports in order to make investment decisions. IBs 
provide an interesting setting to test the role of Islamic religious norms on accounting reliability.  
 
One of the main objectives of Islamic accounting is to enhance accountability by providing 
a fair information flow between the accountant and the accountee (Lewis, 2006). The 
accountability of financial institutions to a broad group of stakeholders requires ethics of enhanced 
disclosure and transparency in their corporate reports. From an Islamic perspective, players are 
required to fulfill the religious obligation of trust (Amana) forcing them to behave with respect to 
justice (Adl), balance (Qist) and perfection (Ihsaan) principles (Beekun and Badawi, 2005). The 
key objectives of Islamic accountability is the fulfillment of obligations to God, society, the 
environment and the self as well as the achievement of success in this world and hereafter (Falah) 
(see Kamla, 2009; Abdul-Baki et al., 2013; Mukhlisin, 2016). With regards to IBs, the Islamic 
accountability theory therefore extends the moral accountability of IB players (managers, board of 
directors, and SSB members) beyond their legal liability. 
 
In pursuance of Falah, transparency in financial contracts and agreements is strongly 
advocated in an Islamic finance context since all stakeholders are required to be morally 
responsible with respect to each other. AAOIFI’s Governance Standards for Islamic Financial 
Institutions stipulates that the Shariah review in IBs emphasizes the role of the SSB in corporate 
reporting reviews, which include the review of “contracts, agreements, policies, products, 
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transactions, memoranda and articles of association, financial statements, reports (especially 
internal audit and central bank inspection), circulars, etc.  ” (AAOIFI-GS2, 2015). By reviewing 
the financial reports, the SSB is expected to exert some influence on the disclosure aspects of the 
IBs (Abdullah et al., 2015). The external and internal Shariah reviews reduce inaccuracies in 
financial statements and intentional misstatements (fraud), and help to disclose pertinent and 
reliable financial information. The SSB works to ensure that the financial interests of all 
stakeholders are protected to avoid a situation of incomplete information. A lack of transparency 
in IBs in this regard could lead to information asymmetry with their stakeholders exposing the bank 
to Gharar2 (Abdullah et al., 2015). Consequently, these features enable each stakeholder, including 
investors, to benefit theoretically from equal, adequate and accurate information. 
 
Furthermore, the Shariah supervision ensured by the Shariah governance mechanisms, such 
Internal and external Shariah review and audit, allows better control of the traceability and the 
management of the funds. Dimitropoulos et al. (2013) show that banks characterised by increased 
audit quality present a higher value relevance of earnings and book value of equity compared to 
firms of a lower audit quality. Besides, the Islamic finance requirement of traceability of funds, the 
strong link with real economy and the restricted set of investment opportunities (non-speculative 
and non-high-risk investments as Shariah constraints on speculation and gambling) allow outside 
investors to have clear view of the quality of IB assets, the related risk profile and the use of funds 
(Toumi et al., 2012). Complying with Islamic finance rules leads to reduced information 
asymmetries with outside investors helping them to trust the bank activities and to rely on the 
disclosed financial information to make investment decisions. 
 
In addition, organisational religiosity induces social norms that could suppress the 
opportunistic behavior of individuals (Weaver and Agle, 2002). Ethics and religious norms appear 
to enhance the quality of accounting numbers by reducing unethical business activities such as 
opportunistic earning management (Brief et al., 1996). Dyreng et al. (2012) highlight that firms 
with a higher level of religious adherence report a lower likelihood of financial restatement and 
have less risk of fraud. In this context, managers of religious oriented organizations are more likely 
                                                            
2 The Gharar is one of the three fundamental prohibitions of Islamic Finance (together with Riba ‘interest’ and Maysir 
‘speculation’). Gharar means uncertainty, hazard, ambiguity and imprecision.  
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to adopt certain moral norms associated with anti-manipulative behavior. Consequently, 
opportunistic behavior by IB managers is also likely to be reduced (Safieddine, 2009; Toumi et al., 
2012; Abdelsalam et al., 2016; Farag et al., 2017;) since moral accountability is likely to reduce 
risk-taking behavior (more conservatism) and discourage or mitigate earnings management 
practices (Abdelsalam et al., 2016; Elnahass et al., 2018; Lassoued et al., 2018). Abdelsalam et al. 
(2016) show that IBs report less discretionary accruals and are more conservative in relation to 
CBs. Lassoued et al. (2018) find that IBs manage their earnings less than CBs. Their result confirms 
the importance of organizational religiosity on corporate decision-making since the religious 
orientation of IBs enhances financial reporting reliability. Elnahass et al. (2018) find significant 
differences in earnings management behavior between IBs and CBs and detect a less significant 
use of loan loss provision (LLP) to manage earnings in IBs relative to their conventional peers. 
 
In sum, IBs see accountability as Amanah towards God, owners and all stakeholders according to the Islamic 
accountability theory. IBs seem less prone to earnings management, which would reduce financial reporting 
risk in these banks. Managers are also expected to prepare reliable financial statements and disclose 
pertinent and reliable financial information. The Islamic finance context thus reflects the importance of 
integrity and ethical values and a commitment to reliable financial reporting, which helps banks operating 
in this context to have relevant accounting numbers.  
 
Thus, we test the first hypothesis (H1): The accounting information of IBs are more relevant 
than those of CBs. 
 
Several studies focused on value relevance of accounting information under several 
accounting standards. Financial statements are prepared either under local or international 
standards such as the IFRS. An important set of prior studies focus on the contribution of IFRS in 
improving value relevance of accounting information (Lenormand and Touchais, 2009; Agostino 
et al., 2011; Leventis et al., 2011; Dimitropoulos et al., 2013; Kim, 2013; Papadamou and 
Tzivinikos, 2013; Manganaris et al., 2015, 2016). Lenormand and Touchais (2009) compare the 
accounting information prepared  under IAS/IFRS with the French accounting standards and find 
an increase in the relevance of earnings per share and equity under the IAS/IFRS standards. 
Anandarajan et al. (2011) argue that the extent of mandated accounting disclosure and the 
differences in accounting measurement practices in banks are the most influencing factors affecting 
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the extent of value relevance of earnings and book values. Agostino et al. (2011), with using a 
panel of 221 European listed banks over the period 2000-2006, find that adopting IFRS enhances 
the information content of both earnings and book value for more transparent European banks. 
Leventis et al. (2011) find that the implementation of IFRS in the European commercial banks 
appears to have improved earnings quality by mitigating the tendency of managers of listed 
commercial banks to engage in earning management. Kim (2013) shows that the relevance of 
accounting information in the Russian financial market improves with the listing of Russian 
companies on the British market, where companies are subject to the IFRS standards, unlike the 
Russian domestic market. Manganaris et al. (2015) find an increase in the informativeness of 
earnings and a significant decrease in book value relevance after mandating IFRS within the 
European banking sector. The results of Manganaris et al. (2016) show that IFRS have reinforced 
the value relevance for both conservative and non-conservative EU banks.  
Thus, we test the second hypothesis (H2): The IFRS accounting standards improves the 
value relevance of accounting information in IBs.  
 
With regards to the Islamic Financial Institutions, special accounting and auditing standards 
have been developed through the accounting and auditing organization for Islamic financial 
institutions (AAOIFI), based in Bahrain and established in 1997. This body is contributing to the 
development of an accounting system that aims to link accounting standards and objectives to 
religious morality (Maurer, 2002; Kamla, 2009; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Kamla and Haque, 
2017;). The Islamic financial system has some unusual transactions that are not considered within 
the frame of the international financial reporting standards IFRS. The objectives of the AAOIFI 
accounting standards are the same as any other standards issued by international accounting bodies 
in the capital market: ‘the provision of decision-usefulness facts for large investors’ (Maurer, 
2002). Concerns about “standardization”, “decision-usefulness”, and “possible regulatory 
interference” led to the establishment of the AAOIFI standards (Maurer, 2002). The aim of AAOIFI 
standards is first to increase market confidence in the activities of Islamic financial institutions; 
second, to render them comparable and finally to facilitate transfer of Islamic banking and finance 
practices across national and regulatory contexts (Maurer, 2002). Despite that for most Islamic 
financial institutions the AAOIFI standards are not mandatory; the AAOIFI has been successful in 
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promoting its standards to Islamic financial institutions globally3. AAOIFI was not enacted to 
replace the IFRS; rather, it provides a complement that fills gaps between conventional and Islamic 
finance transactions (Hassan et al., 2019). For instance, the treatment of the mandatory charitable 
“zakat” distribution, the protection of unrestricted investment account holders' principal, and 
reserve funds for profit smoothing are some of the issues absent from the IFRS framework but are 
accounted for by the AAOIFI standards (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). So establishing specific 
standards that focus on the Islamic specificities of Islamic contracts is necessary for fair treatment 
and accountability in the industry. Prior to AAOIFI, the Islamic financial institutions relied on the 
opinions of their SSBs, managers and auditors to solve problems related to accounting treatment 
in accordance with Islamic finance laws. Integrating and strengthening AAOIFI standards is 
essential to provide accountability, fairness and disclosure in Islamic financial transactions (Hassan 
et al., 2019). 
Thus, we test the third hypothesis (H3): The AAOIFI accounting standards increase the 
value relevance of accounting information in IBs.  
 
2. Research design 
2.1.Sample  
The sample consists of 201 listed banks from 14 countries categorised into 47 IBs, 112 CBs and 
42 HBs (Table 1). Our study covers the period 2010-20184. Data are collected from the financial 
database Eikon-Thomson Reuters. All bank variables are winsorized at the 1 % and 99 % 
percentiles to reduce the influence of outliers and potential data errors. 
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
2.2.Econometric modeling 
The literature offers several models to examine the value relevance of accounting information (see 
Kothari and Zimmerman, 1995; Ohlson, 1995; Collins et al., 1997; Barth et al., 2008). Using the 
basic and most used model in the literature on value relevance (Kothari and Zimmerman, 1995; 
                                                            
3 By 2020, AAOIFI accounting standards are adopted either fully or partially as mandatory regulatory requirements in 
11 jurisdictions (Source : AAOIFI Website) 
4 Periods with the most complete data 
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Ohlson, 1995) that associates market value of equity with book value and earnings, we run the 
following models: 
 
Pit= α0 + α1EPSit +∑ 𝛼𝑗 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝑛−1𝑗=2  + αn DummyYear +εt   (Eq1) 




𝑗=2  + βn DummyYear +  εt   (Eq2) 
 
Where, Pt is the price of a share of firm i three months after fiscal year-end t,; EPSit is the earnings per share of firm i 
at the end of year t; BVPSit is the book value per share of firm i at the end of year t; Xit is the Control variables; n: 
number of variables, α and β are a regression coefficient; ε is an error term. 
 
As Dimitropoulos et al. (2010) argue, including both EPS and BVPS in the same model increases 
the efficiency of the estimation. We run the following model.  
Pit= γ0 + γ1EPSit + γ2 BVPSit +∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝑛−1
𝑗=3  + γn DummyYear+ εt   (Eq3) 
 
Furthermore, to test the moderation effect of IFRS and AAOIFI (as moderator variables), two 
regressions should be conducted to see whether the moderation effect occurs (Baron and Kenny, 
1986; Aiken and West, 1991; Helm and Mark, 2012).   
 
- The first basic regression predicts Pit from the moderator variable and the independent 
variables EPSit and BVPSit  (See Eq. 4). Both variables should be significant.  
 
Pit= δ0 + δ 1EPSit + δ2 BVPSit + δ3 IFRS +∑ 𝛿𝑗 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝑛−1𝑗=4  + δn DummyYear+ εt (Eq4) 
For IBs and HBs, we run additional regressions with “adopting mandatory accounting standards 
of AAOIFI” as a moderator variable. 
 
- In the second regression, the interaction model, we add the interaction terms to the basic 
model. The moderation effect is indicated by the interaction terms EPS*IFRS and 
BVPS*IFRS in explaining Pit. Moderation occurs when the interaction term is significant 
and R² of the interaction model is higher. For IBs and HBs, we run additional regressions 




We control for year and country fixed effects in all models. We first run each model for the 
whole period with the examining value relevance for each category of banks (all banks, CBs, IBs 
and HBs). Secondly, we test the moderation effect of adopting IFRS on bank value relevance. 
Thirdly, we test value relevance for banks that mandatory adopt AAOIFI accounting standards. In 
all models, standard errors are adjusted thus controlling for potential heteroscedasticity. 
 
We consider several control variables in our models. We add a bank specific variable such 
as the bank size (SIZEit), the firms’ risk profile measured by the leverage (LEVit) and the firm's 
operational performance (measured by the return on assets ROAit) (Tahat and Alhadab, 2017).  We 
also consider the following macro-economic variables: the stock market capitalization to GDP ratio 
(SMCt), the supervisory Pillar 3 disclosure requirements for banks (PIL3t), the GDP growth rate 
(GDPt), and the inflation rate (INFLt). Anandarajan et al. (2011) argue that the macro-levels are 
the most influencing factors affecting the extent of value relevance of earnings and book values. 
All variables are defined in table 2. 
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
3. Empirical results 
 
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics. Our results reveal that the bank earnings’ (EPS) has an 
average of $0.105 per share with a higher value for HBs in average ($0.119 per share for HBs 
versus $0.107 per share for CBs and $0.088 per share for IBs). Our results also show that the Book 
value per share (BVPS) has an average value of $1.171 with a higher value on average for HBs 
($1.348 versus $1.259 for CBs and $0.790 for IBs). With regards to the adoption of IFRS, 50.8 % 
of sampled banks are implementing these standards. We have an evenly spread sample on the 
application of IFRS. More than 67.1% IBs have implemented IFRS against 51% for HBs and 44% 
for CBs. Moreover, 33.1% of IBs and 26.9% of HBs implement the mandatory accounting 
standards of AAOIFI if relevant standards exist.  Besides, 45.6% of banks disclose financial 
information related to risks in conformity with the Basel Pillar 3 - Market Discipline. The higher 
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value is recorded for IBs where 56.9% of these banks respect the Basel pillar 3 disclosure 
requirements (versus 52.3% for HBs and 38.3% for HBs). 
The Two-sample t-test (Two-tailed) highlights a mean difference for the majority of variables used, 
in particular for the stock price between CBs and banks offering Islamic financial services (IBs and 
HBs).  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
The matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients indicates relatively weak association between the 
explanatory variables (see Table 4).  
(Insert Table 4) 
 
 
3.2. Regression results on value relevance in Islamic banks   
 
For the first step, we test whether earnings per share and book value of equity per share value 
relevance varies between the different categories of banks. The table 5 shows the empirical findings 
of regressions examining the value relevance of accounting numbers for the full sample 
(Culumns1-3), for CBs (Columns, 4-6), for IBs (Columns, 7-9) and for HBs (Columns 10-12). 
First, we investigate the relevance for EPS (Columns 1, 4, 7 and 10) as well as for BVPS (Columns 
2, 5, 8 and 11). Second, we add both EPS and BVPS on the same regressions (Columns 3, 6, 9 and 
12) to increase the efficiency of the estimation as Dimitropoulos et al. (2010) argue.  All models 
are significant at 1% significance level. 
 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
When considering the results of regressions with separate EPS and BVPS in table 5, both 
accounting numbers are observed to be relevant at 1% level for all sampled banks (Columns 1-2) 
as well as for CBs (Columns 4-5), for IBs (Columns 7-8) and for HBs (Columns 10-11). Our results 
are in line with the previous literature on the relevance of the accounting informaiton in banks 
(Dimitropoulos et al., 2010; Agostino et al., 2011; Anandarajan et al., 2011). Besides, the results 
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of regressions with both variables EPS and BVPS reveal a significance of the two accounting 
information at 1 % level when we consider all sampled banks and the CBs (Columns 3 and 6).  
 
Re-estimating the models for IBs, both the EPS and BVPS coefficients are positive and 
significant at 1 % and 10 % significance level respectively (Column 9). For HBs, BVPS is value 
relevant at 1% level but not the EPS (Column 12). More interestingly, the higher magnitude of EPS 
on stock price is observed for HBs when considering regressions with EPS only, followed by the 
IBs and the CBs (Columns 4, 7 and 10). We find that an increase of 1$ in EPS increases 
significantly the stock price of HBs with $14.80 (versus $5.60 for IBs and $3.84 for CBs). The 
same results are observed for BVPS when considering regressions with BVPS only (Columns, 5, 
8 and 11). The results indicate that for every additional dollar in BVPS, we expect the stock price 
to increase significantly by $1.00 for HBs, $0.75 for IBs and $0.18 for CBs. The regressions with 
both EPS and BVPS give the same conclusions; HBs followed by the IBs appear to have the higher 
coefficients of EPS (columns 6, 9) and BVPS (Columns 6, 9 and 12). The Islamic dimension seems 
to play a role in increasing the reliability of the financial information in these institutions and 
bringing confidence to the general public and the financial markets on the credibility of Islamic 
financial institutions. 
 
Our results support the first hypothesis (H1) that the value relevance of accounting numbers will 
be higher for banks with Islamic ethical dimension. Our results are in line with the recent literature 
arguing that IBs see accountability as Amanah towards God, owners and all stakeholders according 
to the Islamic accountability theory. IBs seem less prone to earnings management, which would 
reduce financial reporting risk in these banks. Previous literature reports that managers of Islamic 
banks are more likely to adopt a certain conservatism in behavior on accounting rules and moral 
accountability associated with anti-manipulative behavior (Abdelsalam et al., 2016; Elnahass et 
al., 2018; Lassoued et al., 2018; Abdelsalam et al., 2020). Their empirical results put in evidence 
that banks following Islamic finance guidelines manage their earnings less compared with their 
conventional peers which leads them to divulge information of better quality to shareholders and 
induces a better value relevance. Besides, transparency and disclosure of more reliable financial 
information reduces the related agency costs between insiders and outside investors (Safieddine, 
2009; Toumi et al., 2012; Abdelsalam et al., 2016; Farag et al., 2017). Furthermore, in pursuance 
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of Falah, transparency in financial contracts and agreements is strongly advocated in an Islamic 
finance context since all stakeholders are required to be morally responsible with respect to each 
other. In addition, the Islamic finance rules, such as traceability, non-speculative and non-high-risk 
investments, leads to reduced information asymmetries with outside investors, helping them trust 
the bank activities. So, complying with Islamic finance ethics appears to give a signal to outside 
investors that they might benefit from equal, adequate and accurate information. The 
complementary checks carried out by SSBs, internal and external Shariah auditors is also an 
advantage for banks respecting Shariah rules, in addition to those traditionally performed by 
conventional auditors. Dimitropoulos et al. (2013) report that banks characterized by increased 
audit quality present a higher value relevance of earnings and book value of equity compared to 
firms of a lower audit quality.Size, as a proxy of bank market capitalisation, is highly significant at 
the 1% significance in all models in Table 4 (except for column 10) and carry a positive sign for 
all categories of banks. Larger banks tend to have higher stock price. Our result is consistent with 
the empirical literature on the significant association between the size and the quality of financial 
information provided by financial firms. Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012) report that analysts 
tend to follow larger banks and these banks are less likely to engage in aggressive earnings 
management (Cornett et al., 2009). Abdelsalam et al. (2016) find that small-sized banks in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region engage in manipulative techniques in order to 
achieve earnings targets and that this situation could reduce financial quality and the relevance of 
accounting numbers. Furthermore, the size of banks is linked with a company's ability to bear the 
costs of disclosures of information that are likely to affect the stock price. 
 
Transparency as measured by Pillar 3 disclosure is highly significant (at the 1% significance level) 
for all banks and sub-categories . Banks disclosing financial information related to risks as required 
by Basel Pillar 3 - Market Discipline framework tend to have lower stock price. For banks, Basel 
Pillar 3 framework complements the minimum capital requirements (Pillar 1) and the supervisory 
review process (Pillar 2). The Pillar 3 disclosures are an effective means of informing the market 
about the risks faced by a bank, and provide a consistent and understandable disclosure framework 
that enhances transparency and comparability. Our results suggest that transparency significantly 
influences market stock prices. Our finding is in line with that of (Anandarajan et al., 2011) arguing 
that greater levels of disclosure have a significant impact on the understanding and interpretation 
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of financial statement numbers by investors. Greater disclosure implies greater understanding of 
the factors influencing the numbers underlying reported earnings, reducing thus stocks market 
value. The firms' level risk (LEV) negatively affects the CBs' market stock price (Columns 4-6). 
Unlike banks offering Islamic financial services, for which indebtedness is not a significant 
variable, investors react negatively to CBs' indebtedness. 
 
3.3.Regression results on value relevance in Islamic banks and IFRS 
 
According to our discussion, it is expected that the value relevance of earning per share and 
the book value of equity will be higher for banks adopters of IFRS. Table 6 presents the regression 
results for the moderation effect of adopting IFRS on the relevance of the accounting information 
for all banks, CBs, IBs and HBs.  
 
(Insert Table 6) 
 
Focusing on the basic models, we find that both EPS and BVPS are relevant at 1% level 
(Columns 1, 3, and 5) and second, that the implementation of IFRS impacts the market stock price 
with a significance at 1 % level for all banks (Panel A) and at 5% level for IBs (Panel C). For HBs, 
only the BVPS appears to be relevant and no significance is detected for the adoption of IFRS.  
 
When considering the interactions models (Columns 2, 4, and 6), the moderation effect of 
adopting IFRS on the relevance of accounting numbers is confirmed for all categories of banks 
except for HBs (Column 8).  
 
Going deeper in details, we detect a pure moderation effect of the implementation of IFRS 
for all banks (Panel A) as first the interaction terms EPS*IFRS and BVPS*IFRS are positive and 
significant at 1%. The introduction of IFRS is thus observed to strengthen the relationship between 
EPS and BVPS with the stock price and contributes thus to greater value relevance of these 
accounting numbers. This finding verifies recent evidence provided by the literature on the increase 
in the relevance of accounting performance indicators for financial and non-financial firms under 
the IFRS (Lenormand and Touchais, 2009; Agostino et al., 2011; Leventis et al., 2011; 
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Dimitropoulos et al., 2013; Kim, 2013; Papadamou and Tzivinikos, 2013; Manganaris et al., 2015, 
2016).  
 
In addition, the relevance of accounting numbers is confirmed under IFRS when we split 
the sample into IBs and CBs separately (Columns 3-6). For both categories of banks, our results 
demonstrate similar findings and indicate a pure moderation effect of adopting IFRS on EPS for 
CBs and quasi moderation for IBs value relevance while an absence of a moderation effect on 
BVPS value relevance (columns 4 and 6). Besides, the interaction terms EPS*IFRS are positive 
and statistically significant at 1% for CBs and IBs with a higher value of the coefficient for IBs 
(10.33 versus 8.5 for CBs). The moderation effect of the application of IFRS on EPS is more 
important for IBs than for CBs, thus verifying H2. Adopting IFRS is observed to strengthen value 
relevance in IBs. We fail however to prove a moderation effect of adopting IFRS on accounting 
numbers relevance for HBs (Column 8)  
 
To complement our analysis related to the first hypothesis H1,  the coefficients of EPS and 
BVPS present a higher positive significant magnitude for IBs (4.78 for EPS and 0.92 for BVPS) 
relative to CBs (4.00 for EPS and 0.21 for BVPS) even when we add IFRS to regressions. For HBs, 
BVPS presents a higher coefficient (1.01) compared to CBs and IBs. 
 
3.4.Value relevance in Islamic banks and AAOIFI 
 
To investigate further the impact of AAOIFI introduction, we run additional regressions. 
According to our discussion, it is expected that value relevance will be impacted by the adoption 
of the mandatory accounting standards of AAOIFI (H3). Table 7 shows our findings.  
 
(Insert Table 7) 
 
Compared to the previous regressions in tables 4 and 5, we add AAOIFI variable to our models in 
table 6. Focusing on the basic models, we find first that both EPS and BVPS are relevant at 1% 
level (Columns 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9) and second, the implementation of AAOIFI is positively associated 
with stock price for IBs (Panel C) and HBs (Panel D). This result shows that banks following 
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Shariah rules and adopters of mandatory AAOIFI accounting standards tend to have higher stock 
price.  
 
For the second step, we consider the interactions models. The moderation effect of adopting 
AAOIFI accounting standards on value relevance is confirmed for IBs and HBs. Focusing on IBs, 
we provide clear evidence that the EPS is less value relevant for banks adopting mandatory 
AAOIFI accounting standards, as reveal the significant and negative coefficient of the interaction 
term EPS*AAOIFI (Columns 2 and 6). However, BVPS is found to be more relevant under 
Mandatory AAOIFI framework as shown by the positive and significant coefficient of the 
interaction term BVPS*AAOIFI (Column 6). When considering HBs, we find opposite results. 
Contrary to IBs, mandatory adopting of AAOIFI accounting standards is observed first to 
strengthen EPS value relevance (Columns 8 and 12) and second, to weaken BVPS value relevance 
(Column 12) in HBs.  
 
The moderation effect of adopting mandatory AAOIFI accounting standards on value relevance 
occurs but differently for IBs and HBs. Our findings reveal that outside investors are aware of the 
existence of AAOIFI accounting standards, where the standards are being used a reference in 
preparing financial statements. The divergence between results may be a signal that AAOIFI 
standards face difficulties to penetrate into the International Financial Institutions (hereafter, IFI) 
market which the industry is dominated by the western industry. AAOIFI was established with the 
aim of providing standards for Islamic finance that are harmonized with global practices. However, 
it  faces various challenges that will require consolidated efforts to overcome them (Hassan et al., 
2019). The adoption of AAOIFI accounting standards is voluntary in most countries and the 
standard-setting body lacks the power to enforce IFIs compliance with its standards (Kamla, 2009). 
Besides, AAOIFI explicitly reveals that its objectives and principles are based on conventional 
ones, adopting those that are consistent with Shariah principles, and excluding those that are not 
(Kamla and Hoque, 2017). The Islamic accounting literature gives examples linked to the failure 
of AAOIFI to offer an indigenous alternative to the Anglo-American logic. Indeed, AAOIFI’s 
objectives and standards did not differ substantially from IASB’s and like IASB, AAOIFI 
embraced concepts like private-self regulation and capital market-orientated standards and focused 
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on the information needs of large multinationals represented by most powerful IFIs (Kamla, 2009; 
Maurer, 2002).  
 




Beyond the price model presented in section 2, Barth et al. (2008) propose three value 
relevance metrics. The first metric is based on the explanatory power from regressions of stock 
price on earning per share and equity book value (See Eq 5). The second and third metrics are 
based on the explanatory power from regressions of earning per share on annual stock return (See 
Eq6). 
 
The first metric of value relevance is the adjusted R2 value from the regression given by: 
 
PRICEit
*= µ0 + µ1EPSit + µ2BVPSit +∑ µ𝑗 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=3  +εt (Eq5) 
To obtain a measure of price that is unaffected by mean difference across countries, we first regress 
stock price (P) on country fixed effect. Then, in a second step, the residuals from this regression 
(PRICE*) are  regressed on EPS and BVPS separately for each category of banks   with considering 
the adoption of IFRS or not. 
 
The second and third value relevance metrics are the R2 value from the regression given by: 
 
[EPS/PRICE]*it= Ω0 + Ω1 RETURNit  +∑ Ω𝑗 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝑛𝑗=2  + Ωn DummyYear +  εt (Eq6) 
Where, [EPS/PRICE] is the earning per share divided by stock price three months after fiscal year end of firm i; 
[EPS/PRICE]* is the residual of regression of EPS/PRICE on country fixed effect. RETURN is stock return of bank i 
three months after fiscal year-end t : Ln(Pt/Pt-1) (Barth et al., 2008; Manganaris et al., 2015); Xit are the control 
variables. 
 
The difference in the quality of information is more pronounced for bad news (in case of negative 
stock RETURN), than for good news (in case of positive stock RETURN) (Ball et al., 2000; Barth 
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et al., 2008). In fact, poor stock market returns could increase the incentive to manage earnings. 
Thus, we estimate two models with EPS depending on whether the stock market return (Eq 6) is 
positive or negative. To obtain good and bad news value relevance metrics that unaffected by mean 
difference across countries, we first regress EPS divided by stock price (EPS/PRICE) on country 
fixed effect. Then, in a second step, the residuals from this regression (EPS/PRICE)* are regressed 
on stock return (RETURN) separately for each category of banks for good and bad news. 





The table 8 presents robustness of relevance of accounting numbers (EPS and BVPS) for 
the different category of banks with considering the adoption of IFRS or not (See Eq 5). 
For IBs, our results show a higher level of adjusted R2 for banks applying IFRS (adj R2 = 42.7%) 
compared to those not applying IFRS (adj R2=26.4%). We report also a higher coefficient of EPS 
(13.80) for IBs adopting IFRS (Column 3). IFRS therefore improves the accounting information 
of IBs. Results are also evidencing an improvement in the adjusted R2 for HBs applying IFRS (adj 
R2=70.1%).  
 
With regards to CBs, while the adjusted R2 for banks not applying IFRS (adj R2= 64.3) is higher 
than those applying IFRS (adj R2=41.1%), but the EPS coefficient (7.64) is higher for CBs 
applying IFRS (versus 6.02 for those not adopting IFRS). Even if the latter results are a little mixed, 
we can still conclude that banks’ accounting information applying IFRS, and more specifically, 
IBs and HBs, has improved. According to Ball et al. (2003), even if companies applying IFRS, 
which are higher quality standards, the effects of the financial reporting system's features, other 
than the standards themselves, could eliminate any improvement in accounting quality arising from 
adopting IFRS. A lax application of IFRS standards in CBs compared to banks offering Islamic 
financial services (IBs and HBs) may lead to limited compliance with the standards, thus limiting 
their effectiveness (Ball et al., 2003).  
 




Table 9 presents the results for the second model of robustness (See Eq 6). The second and 
third robustness value relevance metrics, for bad news and good news, respectively, show higher 
R2 for bad news (12%) for IBs, compared to good news (11%). The same result is found for HBs 
where R² values are 25% and 23% for bad and good news, respectively. The results are different 
for CBs, where the R2 for good news (40%) is much higher than for bad news (4%). According to 
Ball et al. (2000, p.21) “…reversing bad investment decisions and strategies is personally more 
costly to managers than continuing good ones…We therefore expect accounting income to be 
asymmetrically conservative in all countries”. Ball et al. (2000) assume that empirically, 
accounting information should exhibit higher R2 for bad news than for good news. Based on Ball 
et al. (2000) analysis, we therefore, highlight the conservatism behavior adopted by IBs and HBs. 
Opportunity and conservatism combined capture much of the commonly used concept of "financial 
disclosure & transparency" for banks offering Islamic financial services. ‘‘Transparency is defined 
as the ability of users to see through the financial statements to comprehend the underlying 
accounting events and transactions in the firm” (Ball et al., 2003, p. 237). Our results show that 
IBs and HBs, through “timely recognition of unrealized losses” by integrated bad news, reduces 
asymmetry and become more transparent than CBs. The study of Ball et al. (2003) shows that 
Asian firms ‘‘timely loss recognition” is not better than it is for firms in code law countries. 
‘‘Accounting standards and preparer incentives in these countries interact to produce generally 
low quality financial reporting, consistent with the hypothesis that reporting quality ultimately is 
determined by the underlying economic and political factors influencing managers’ and auditors’ 
incentives, and not by accounting standards” (Ball et al., 2003, p.236). Therefore, there is a 
significant contribution of compliance with Islamic Finance rules in IBs and HBs that substantially 
reduces managers’ opportunistic behavior to manage earnings, which can lead to relevant 
accounting information. 




The purpose of this study is to investigate the relevance of the accounting numbers of banks 
with particular attention to banks following Islamic finance ethics with considering the 
24 
 
international standards IFRS and AAOIFI. The panel is composed of  201 listed banks from 14 
countries over the period 2010-2018.  
 
The results show that the earnings per share (EPS) and book value of equity per share 
(BVPS) are generally relevant for all banks and that this relevance is higher for IBs and HBs, 
compared to CBs. Besides, we provide evidence on the moderation effect of IFRS and AAOIFI on 
the relevance of the accounting information in IBs. Our findings support the notion that religiosity 
tends to reduce unethical activities by managers and function as an alternative control mechanism 
for disclosing reliable information.  
Our findings offer a number of practical implications. Apart from highlighting the 
usefulness of bank accounting information helping investors in financial markets to make 
investment decisions, the study is useful for investors who consider Islamic ethical practices when 
making their investment decisions. Our study puts into perspective that compliance with Islamic 
finance ethics would bring confidence to the general public and the financial markets regarding the 
credibility of Islamic banks. Our findings also highlight challenges facing AAOIFI initiative to 
bring public confidence. Therefore, strengthening collaboration between regulators and AAOIFI is 
required. Such cooperation will create an enabling environment for investors for their decision-
making process. 
 
One limitation of our research is the reduced number of sampled listed IBs since we deleted 
countries that do not have both listed Islamic and conventional banks. Furthermore, we did not take 
into consideration corporate governance characteristics in the current research due to data 
availability. Future research could investigate the moderating role of corporate governance on the 




AAOIFI-GS2. (2015), “Shari ’a Review (Governance Standard for Islamic Financial Institutions No.2)”, 
Accounting Auditing and Governance Standards. 
25 
 
Abdelsalam, O., Dimitropoulos, P., Elnahass, M. and Leventis, S. (2016), “Earnings management behaviors 
under different monitoring mechanisms: The case of Islamic and conventional banks”, Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier B.V., Vol. 132, pp. 155–173. 
Abdelsalam, O., Chantziaras, A., Omoteso, K., & Ibrahim, M. (2020), "The impact of religiosity on earnings 
quality: International evidence from the banking sector", The British Accounting Review, In Press. 
Abdul-Baki, Z., Bukola Uthman, A., Aliu Olanrewaju, A. and Aramide Ibrahim, S. (2013), “Islamic 
perspective of management accounting decision making techniques”, Journal of Islamic Accounting 
and Business Research, Vol. 4 No. 2, pp. 203–219. 
Abdullah, W.A.W., Percy, M. and Stewart, J. (2015), “Determinants of voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure: Evidence from Islamic banks in the Southeast Asian and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
regions”, Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Vol. 11 No. 3, pp. 262–279. 
Abuzayed, B., Molyneux, P. and Al-Fayoumi, N. (2009), “Market value, book value and earnings: is bank 
efficiency a missing link?”, Managerial Finance, Vol. 35 No. 2, pp. 156–179. 
Agostino, M., Drago, D. and Silipo, D.B. (2011), “The value relevance of IFRS in the European banking 
industry”, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol. 36 No. 3, pp. 437–457. 
Ahmad, I. (2006), “Is economic value added more associated with stock return than accounting earnings? 
The UK evidence”, International Journal of Managerial Finance, Vol. 2 No. 4, pp. 343–353. 
Aiken, L.S. and West, S.G. (1991), “Multiple Regression Testing and Interpreting Interactions”, SAGE 
PUBLISHING. 
Alali, F.A. and Foote, P.S. (2012), “The value relevance of international financial reporting standards: 
Empirical evidence in an emerging market”, The International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 47 No. 
1, pp. 85–108. 
Al-Hares, O.M., AbuGhazaleh, N.M. and Haddad, A.E. (2012), “Value relevance of earnings, book value 
and dividends in an emerging capital market: Kuwait evidence”, Global Finance Journal, Vol. 23 
No. 3, pp. 221–234. 
Almutairi, A.R. and Quttainah, M.A. (2017), “Corporate governance: evidence from Islamic banks”, Social 
Responsibility Journal, Vol 13, No. 3, pp. 601-624. 
Amir, E., Harris, T.S. and Venuti, E.K. (1993), “A comparison of the value-relevance of U.S. versus Non-
U.S. GAAP accounting measures using Form 20-F reconciliations”, Journal of Accounting 
Research, Vol. 31 No. 3, pp. 230–264. 
Anandarajan, A., Francis, B., Hasan, I. and John, K. (2011), “Value relevance of banks: global evidence”, 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol. 36 No. 1, pp. 33–55. 
Ball, R. and Brown, P. (1968), “An empirical evaluation of accounting income numbers”, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 6 No. 2, pp. 159–178. 
26 
 
Ball, R., Kothari, S. P., & Robin, A. (2000), "The effect of international institutional factors on properties 
of accounting earnings". Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 29 No. 1, pp. 1-51 
Ball, R., Robin, A., & Wu, J. S. (2003), "Incentives versus standards: properties of accounting income in 
four East Asian countries", Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 36 No. 1-3, pp. 235-270. 
Baron, R.M. and Kenny, D.A. (1986), “The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological 
research – Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations”, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, Vol. 51 No. 6, pp. 1173–1182. 
Barth, M.E., Beaver, W.H. and Landsman, W.R. (1996), “Value-relevance of banks’ fair value disclosures 
under SFAS No. 107”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 71 No. 4, pp. 513–537. 
Barth, M. E., Landsman, W. R., & Lang, M. H. (2008). "International accounting standards and accounting 
quality", Journal of accounting research, Vol. 46 No. 3, pp. 467-498. 
Basiruddin, R. and Ahmed, H. (2019), “Corporate governance and shariah noncompliant risk in Islamic 
banks : Evidence from Indonesia and Malaysia”, Corporate Governance, pp. 1–24. 
Beekun, R.I. and Badawi, J.A. (2005), “Balancing ethical responsibility among multiple organizational 
stakeholders: The Islamic perspective”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 60 No. 2, pp. 131–145. 
Brief, P., Dukerich, J.M., Brown, P.R. and Brett, J.F. (1996), “What’s wrong with the treadway commission 
report? Experimental analyses of the effects of personal values and codes of conduct on fraudulent 
financial reporting”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 183–198. 
Burke, Q.L. and Wieland, M.M. (2017), “Value relevance of banks’ cash flows from operations”, Advances 
in Accounting Journal, Vol. 39 No. 60–78. 
Collins, D.W., Maydew, E.L. and Weiss, I.S. (1997), “Changes in the value-relevance of earnings and book 
values over the past forty years”, Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 24 No. 1, pp. 39–67. 
Cornett, M.M., McNutt, J.J. and Tehranian, H. (2009), “Corporate governance and earnings management at 
large US bank holding companies”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp. 412–430. 
Dhaliwal, D., Subramanyam, K.R. and Trezevant, R. (1999), “Is comprehensive income superior to net 
income as a measure of firm performance?”, Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 26 No. 1–
3, pp. 43–67. 
Dimitropoulos, P.E., Asteriou, D. and Koumanakos, E. (2010), “The relevance of earnings and cash flows 
in a heavily regulated industry: Evidence from the Greek banking sector”, Advances in Accounting, 
Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 290–303. 
Dimitropoulos, P.E., Asteriou, D., Kousenidis, D. and Leventis, S. (2013), “The impact of IFRS on 
accounting quality: Evidence from Greece”, Advances in Accounting, Vol. 29 No. 1, pp. 108–123. 
Dumontier, P. and Labelle, R. (1998), “Accounting earnings and firm valuation: the French case”, European 
Accounting Review, Vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 163–183. 
27 
 
Dumontier, P. and Raffournier, B. (1999), “Vingt ans de recherche positive en comptabilité financière”, 
Comptabilité Contrôle Audit, Vol. numero spe, pp. 179–197. 
Dumontier, P. and Raffournier, B. (2002). “Accounting and capital markets: a survey of the European 
evidence”.  European Accounting Review,  Vol. 11 No. 1, pp. 119-151. 
Dyreng, S.D., Mayew, W.J. and Williams, C.D. (2012), “Religious social norms and corporate financial 
reporting”, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 39 No. 7–8, pp. 845–875. 
Eccher, E.A., Ramesh, K. and Thiagarajan, S.R. (1996), “Fair value disclosures by bank holding 
companies”, Conference Issue on Contemporary Financial Reporting Issues, Vol. 22 No. 1, pp. 79–
117. 
Elnahass, M., Izzeldin, M. and Steele, G. (2018), “Capital and earnings management: Evidence from 
alternative banking business models”, International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 53 No. 1, pp. 20–
32. 
Farag, H., Mallin, C. and Ow-Yong, K. (2017), “Corporate governance in Islamic banks: New insights for 
dual board structure and agency relationships”, Journal of International Financial Markets, 
Institutions and Money, Vol. 54, pp. 59-77.  
Feltham, G.A. and Ohlson, J.A. (1995), “Valuation and clean surplus accounting for operating and financial 
activities”, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. 689–731. 
Fields, T.D., Rangan, S. and Ramu Thiagarajan, S. (1998), “An empirical evaluation of the usefulness of 
Non-GAAP accounting measures in the real estate investment trust industry”, Review of Accounting 
Studies, Vol. 3 No. 1/2, pp. 103–130. 
Grais, W. and Pellegrini, M. (2006), “Corporate governance and stakeholders’ financial interests in 
institutions offering Islamic financial services”. 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/9028 
Haniffa, R. and Hudaib, M. (2007), “Exploring the ethical identity of Islamic banks via communication in 
annual reports”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 76 No. 1, pp. 97–116. 
Harris, T.S., Lang, M. and Peter Möller, H. (1994), “The value relevance of German accounting measures: 
An empirical analysis”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 32 No. 2, pp. 187–209. 
Hassan, M.K., Aliyu, S., Huda, M. and Rashid, M. (2019), “A survey on Islamic Finance and accounting 
standards”, Borsa Istanbul Review, Vol. 19, pp. S1–S13. 
Helm, R. and Mark, A. (2012), “Analysis and evaluation of moderator effects in regression models: State 
of art, alternatives and empirical example”, Review of Managerial Science, Vol. 6 No. 4, pp. 307–
332. 
Holthausen, R.W. and Watts, R.L. (2001), “The relevance of the value-relevance literature for financial 
accounting standard setting”, Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 31 No. 1–3, pp. 3–75. 
28 
 
IASB. (2008), “Exposure Draft: Conceptual Framework for Improved Financial Information”, in IASB 
(Ed.), . 
IASB. (2010), “Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting”, presented at the Exposure Draft 
ED/2010/2 UK: International Accounting Standards Board. 
Kadri, M.H. (2016), “Value relevance of book value and earnings: a comparison between Islamic and 
conventional banks in Malaysia.”, Malaysian Accounting Review, Vol. 15 No. 2. 
Kamla, R. (2009), “Critical insights into contemporary Islamic accounting”, Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, Vol. 20 No. 8, pp. 921–932. 
Kamla, R. and Haque, F. (2017), “Islamic accounting, neo-imperialism and identity staging: The 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions”, Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, pp. 1–20. 
Kamla, R. and Rammal, H.G. (2013), “Social reporting by Islamic banks: does social justice matter?”, 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 26 No. 6, pp. 911–945. 
Keener, M.H. (2011), “The relative value relevance of earnings and book value across industries”, Journal 
of Finance & Accountancy, Vol. 6, pp. 1–19. 
Kim, O. (2013), “Russian accounting system: Value relevance of reported information and the IFRS 
adoption perspective”, The International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 48 No. 4, pp. 525–547. 
Kothari, S.P. and Zimmerman, J.L. (1995), “Price and return models”, Journal of Accounting & Economics, 
Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 155–192. 
Lassoued, N., Attia, M.B.R. and Sassi, H. (2018), “Earnings management in islamic and conventional banks: 
Does ownership structure matter? Evidence from the MENA region”, Journal of International 
Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Vol. 30 December, pp. 85–105. 
Lee, H.-L. and Lee, H. (2013), “Do Big 4 audit firms improve the value relevance of earnings and equity?”, 
Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 28 No. 7, pp. 628–646. 
Lenormand, G. and Touchais, L. (2009), “Les IFRS améliorent-elles la qualité de l’information financière ? 
Approche par la value relevance”, Comptabilité-Contrôle-Audit, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 145–163. 
Leventis, S., Dimitropoulos, P.E. and Anandarajan, A. (2011), “Loan loss provisions, earnings management 
and capital management under IFRS: The case of EU commercial banks”, Journal of Financial 
Services Research, Vol. 40 No. 1, pp. 103–122. 
Leventis, S. and Dimitropoulos, P. (2012), “The role of corporate governance in earnings management: 
experience from US banks”, Journal of Applied Accounting Research, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 161–177. 
Lewis, K.M. (2006), “Islam and accounting. Accounting Forum, Vol. 25 No. 2, pp. 103–127. 
29 
 
Manganaris, P., Spathis, C. and Dasilas, A. (2015), “The effects of mandatory IFRS adoption and 
conditional conservatism on European bank values”, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing 
and Taxation, Vol. 24, pp. 72–81. 
Manganaris, P., Spathis, C. and Dasilas, A. (2016), “How institutional factors and IFRS affect the value 
relevance of conservative and non-conservative banks”, Journal of Applied Accounting Research. 
Vol 17, No. 2, pp. 211-236. 
Martinez, I. (2004), “Le contenu informatif des chiffres comptables: vers de nouvelles améliorations 
méthodologiques?”, Comptabilité Contrôle Audit, Vol. 10 No. 2, pp. 9–30. 
Maurer, B. (2002), “Anthropological and accounting knowledge in Islamic banking and finance : Rethinking 
critical accounts”, The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 645–667. 
Mukhlisin, M. (2016), “How ethical are financial reporting standards for Islamic financial institutions?”, 
presented at the the annual British Accounting and Finance Association (BAFA), Bath, UK. 
Nelson, K.K. (1996), “Fair value accounting for commercial banks: An empirical analysis of SFAS No. 
107”, Accounting Review, Vol. 71 No. 2, pp. 161–182. 
Nienhaus, V. (2011), “Islamic finance ethics and Shari’ah law in the aftermath of the crisis: Concept and 
practice of Shari’ah compliant finance”, Ethical Perspectives, Vol. 18 No. 4, pp. 591–623. 
Ohlson, J.A. (1995), “Earnings, book values, and dividends in equity valuation”, Contemporary Accounting 
Research, Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. 661–687. 
Papadamou, S. and Tzivinikos, T. (2013), “The risk relevance of International Financial Reporting 
Standards: Evidence from Greek banks”, International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 27, pp. 
43–54. 
Qu, X. and Zhang, G. (2015), “Value-relevance of earnings and book value over the institutional transition 
in China: The suitability of fair value accounting in this emerging market”, The International 
Journal of Accounting, Vol. 50 No. 2, pp. 195–223. 
Safieddine, A. (2009), “Islamic financial institutions and corporate governance: New insights for agency 
theory”, Corporate Governance, Vol. 17 No. 2, pp. 142–158. 
Tahat, Y. A., & Alhadab, M. (2017), "Have accounting numbers lost their value relevance during the recent 
financial credit crisis?", The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 66, pp.182-191. 
Toumi, K., Louhichi, W. and Viviani, J.-L. (2012), “Alternative financial decision principles: Theoretical 
foundations of Islamic banks’ capital structure”, In Recent Developments in Alternative Finance: 
Empirical Assessments and Economic Implications, (International Symposia in Economic Theory 
and Econometrics, Volume 22). William A. Barnett, Fredj Jawadi (Ed.) Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited, Vol. 22, pp. 157–172. 
30 
 
Venkatachalam, M. (1996), “Value-relevance of banks’ derivatives disclosures”, Journal of Accounting & 
Economics, Vol. 22 No. 1–3, pp. 327–355. 
Weaver and Agle. (2002), “Religiosity and ethical behaviour in organizations: a symbolic interactionist 








































Islamic banks (IBs) 
Panel D:  
Hybrid Banks (HBs) 
BAHRAIN 11 3 6 2 
BANGLADESH 31 14 8 9 
EGYPT 13 8 3 2 
INDONESIA 30 27 1 2 
IRAQ 11 8 3 0 
JORDAN 12 10 2 0 
KUWAIT 9 4 4 1 
MALAYSIA 9 3 1 5 
OMAN 6 3 1 2 
PAKISTAN 19 10 3 6 
QATAR 8 3 3 2 
SAUDI ARABIA 12 4 4 4 
SYRIAN ARAB 
REPUBLIC 9 8 1 0 
UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES 21 7 7 7 

















Table 2: Variables description 
Variable Notation Description Source 
Price PRICEit 
Price of a share of bank i three months after fiscal 




Stock return of bank i three months after fiscal 





Earnings Per Share EPSit 








Book value per share of bank i at the end of year t 




Ln of bank market value ( MV) three months after 






Dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank considers 






Dummy variable that takes 1 if the country requires 
compliance with AAOIFI “accounting” standards for 
banks offering Islamic financial services (if relevant 
standards exist), 0 otherwise. 
Central banks  
AAOIFI  




Dummy variable that takes 1 if the supervisor in a 
given country requires banks the implementation of 




BIS, FSI Survey : 
Basel II, 2.5 and III 
Implementation 
Stock Market 
Capitalization to GDP 
Ratio 
SMCt 
Total value of Stock Market Capitalization in % of 
GDP in a given country at year t. 
World Bank 
database 
GDP growth rate GDPt 




Inflation rate INFLt Bank i country inflation rate at time t in % 
World Bank 
database 

















Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Full Sample Two-sample t-test 
(Two-tailed) Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PRICE 1.841 3.577 0 32.67 -1,892** 
EPS .1052 .172 0 1.59 0.475 
BVPS 1.171 2.531 -.139 28.766 1.647** 
RETURN .080 .876 -3.931 3.784 0,256* 
SIZE 6.468 1.744 1.845 10.416 -3.499*** 
AAOIFI .313 .463 0 1 0.861 
IFRS .508 .500 0 1 -6.458** 
PIL3 .456 .498 0 1 -7.052*** 
SMC 14.252 14.090 0 75.017 -3.695** 
ROA 1.504 1.582 -24.05 9.57 4.082*** 
LEV 11.842 11.827 -102.99 79.34 -6.373*** 
GDP 4.543 2.758 -4.712 19.592 0.418 
INFLT 4.654 4.576 -2.425 36.702 3.610*** 
Panel B: Sub-sample of conventional banks (CBs)  
PRICE 1.699 3.048 0 32.67  
EPS .107 .169 0 1.59  
BVPS 1.259 2.627 -.139 28.766  
RETURN .0857 1.111 -3.931 3.784  
SIZE 6.340 1.836 1.845 10.397  
AAOIFI .321 .467 0 1  
IFRS .441 .496 0 1  
PIL3 .383 .486 0 1  
SMC 13.133 11.646 0 75.017  
ROA 1.647 1.507 -9.91 9.57  
LEV 10.257 11.787 -102.99 77.22  
GDP 4.568 2.676 -4.712 19.592  
INFLT 5.021 4.891 -2.425 36.702  
Panel C: Sub-sample of Islamic banks (IBs)  
PRICE 2.063 4.213 0 27.61  
EPS .088 .148 0 1.25  
BVPS .790 .971 0 5.944  
RETURN .136 .488 -1.629 2.089  
SIZE 6.382 1.587 2.823 10.416  
AAOIFI .331 .471 0 1  
IFRS .671 .470 0 1  
PIL3 .569 .495 0 1  
SMC 14.248 15.343 0 75.017  
ROA 1.155 2.055 -24.05 8.09  
34 
 
LEV 15.111 14.169 0 79.34  
GDP 4.308 3.153 -4.712 19.592  
INFLT 3.999 4.348 -2.425 36.702  
Panel D: Hybrid Banks (HBs)  
PRICE 1.973 4.079 .01 32.67  
EPS .119 .2015 0 1.59  
BVPS 1.348 3.279 .011 28.766  
RETURN .012 .443 -1.252 1.704  
SIZE 6.902 1.588 3.223 10.199  
AAOIFI .269 .444 0 1  
IFRS .510 .500 0 1  
PIL3 .523 .500 0 1  
SMC 17.419 17.919 0 75.017  
ROA 1.536 .964 -3.37 4.16  
LEV 12.382 7.399 0 43.36  
GDP 4.742 2.467 -4.712 19.592  
INFLT 4.441 3.857 -2.425 29.501  
Notes: The table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables considered in our analyses. The sample period is 2010 to 
2018. Panel A: results for the full sample including IBs, HBs and CBs with 1809 bank-year observations. Panel B: results for the 
sub-sample of CBs representing 1008 bank-year observations. Panel C: results for IBs sub-sample comprising 423 bank-year 
observations; Panel D: results for the sub-sample of HBs representing 378 bank-year observations; We report on the paired sample 
mean test (t-test) for IBs and CB_IWs compared with sub-samples of CBs. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 















Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
  EPS BVPS IFRS SIZE PIL3 SMC ROA LEV GDP INFLT 
EPS 1.0000                    
BVPS 0.5872* 1.0000                  
IFRS 0.2621* 0.1778* 1.0000                
SIZE 0.4223* 0.1828* 0.3217* 1.0000              
PIL3 0.2553* 0.1691* 0.2652* 0.1764* 1.0000            
SMC 0.3804* 0.2134* 0.2284* 0.4240* 0.2800* 1.0000          
ROA 0.1497* 0.0930* 0.1043* 0.2462* 0.1190* 0.0714* 1.0000        
LEV 0.0574 0.0245 0.1809* 0.1005* 0.1975* 0.0786* 0.0610  1.0000      
GDP 0.1599* 0.1229* 0.3076* 0.0786* 0.1884* 0.0470 0.1258* -0.0350 1.0000    
INFLT 0.1002* 0.0285 0.4278* 0.3324* 0.1348* 0.1868* 0.0656* -0.1810* 0.0440 1.0000 








 Table 5 : Value relevance of accounting numbers for banks. Period:  2010-2018 
  Panel A : Full sample Panel B : Sub-sample CBs Panel C : Sub-sample IBs Panel D : Sub-sample HBs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES  PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE 
              
EPS  5.62***  4.44*** 3.84***  4.04*** 5.60***  5.07*** 14.80***  -0.30 
  (0.54)  (0.55) (0.66)  (0.64) (1.38)  (1.47) (0.98)  (1.21) 
BVPS   0.40*** 0.40***  0.18*** 0.21***  0.75** 0.67*  1.00*** 1.01*** 
   (0.04) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.03)  (0.34) (0.35)  (0.03) (0.06) 
SIZE  0.37*** 0.54*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.51*** 0.34*** 0.50*** 0.64*** 0.48** 0.16 0.32** 0.33** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.24) (0.14) (0.15) 
PIL3  -1.55*** -1.54*** -1.62*** -1.13*** -1.17*** -1.22*** -2.05*** -1.94*** -2.14*** -1.99*** -1.62*** -1.61*** 
  (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.37) (0.37) (0.39) (0.54) (0.54) (0.55) (0.66) (0.48) (0.48) 
SMC  0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04** 0.03* 0.04** 0.03 0.03* 0.03 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
ROA  0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.03 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.11 0.04 0.04 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.21) (0.15) (0.15) 
LEV  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03* -0.02* -0.03** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
GDP  0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.11** 0.10** 0.10** 0.15** 0.12** 0.12** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
INFLT  0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.10* 0.08* 0.08* 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant  -1.03 -1.95*** -0.94 -0.73 -1.16 -0.48 -1.43 -2.44* -1.32 -0.49 -1.32 -1.38 
  (0.67) (0.69) (0.61) (0.90) (0.95) (0.81) (1.37) (1.46) (1.40) (2.21) (1.39) (1.42) 
              
Observations  1,361 1,354 1,347 738 742 735 336 325 325 287 287 287 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country_Fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2_o  0.552 0.580 0.635 0.537 0.534 0.575 0.662 0.633 0.678 0.716 0.860 0.860 
Cchi2  824.8*** 735.3*** 1291*** 503.2*** 424.0*** 770.1*** 267.2*** 194.9*** 290.8*** 434.5*** 1594*** 1588*** 
Breusch-Pagam 
test 
Chibar2 349.92 515.31 173.82 117.84 132.53 39.48 55.97 83.89 32.52 6.55 6.32 6.33 
Prob>Chibar2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects reject the null hypothesis and conclude random effects is appropriate after Hausmann test,  






 Table 6 : Moderation effect of IFRS on value relevance of accounting numbers for banks. Period:  2010-2018 
  Panel A : Full sample Panel B : Sub-sample CBs Panel C : Sub-sample IBs Panel D : Sub-sample HBs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES  PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE 
EPS  4.43*** -0.21 4.00*** -0.25 4.78*** 1.14 -0.29 0.35 
  (0.55) (0.72) (0.64) (0.80) (1.47) (1.79) (1.22) (3.07) 
BVPS  0.40*** 0.12*** 0.21*** 0.14*** 0.92** 0.02 1.01*** 0.25 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.37) (0.55) (0.06) (0.54) 
IFRS  0.21 -0.93*** -0.16 -1.18*** 1.07** -0.39 0.01 -0.61 
  (0.27) (0.28) (0.43) (0.43) (0.53) (0.81) (0.46) (0.71) 
EPS_IFRS   5.22***  8.50***  10.33***  -0.96 
   (1.05)  (1.39)  (2.95)  (3.24) 
BVPS_IFRS   0.56***  0.09  0.29  0.78 
   (0.07)  (0.12)  (0.57)  (0.55) 
SIZE  0.36*** 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.28*** 0.43** 0.34* 0.33** 0.39** 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.20) (0.19) (0.15) (0.16) 
PIL3  -1.61*** -1.52*** -1.23*** -1.29*** -2.04*** -1.87*** -1.61*** -1.59*** 
  (0.27) (0.26) (0.39) (0.37) (0.55) (0.56) (0.49) (0.49) 
SMC  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02 0.02 0.05** 0.05** 0.03 0.02 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
ROA  -0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.00 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.15) (0.16) 
LEV  -0.01 -0.01* -0.03** -0.03** -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
GDP  0.11*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.10** 0.12*** 0.12** 0.13** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
INFLT  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.08* 0.06 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant  -1.19* 0.04 -0.30 0.80 -2.22 -0.37 -1.40 -1.27 
  (0.69) (0.65) (0.96) (0.94) (1.47) (1.49) (1.50) (1.50) 
          
Observations  1,347 1,347 735 735 325 325 287 287 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country_Fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2_o  0.635 0.677 0.575 0.609 0.686 0.720 0.860 0.861 
Chi2  1284*** 1652*** 759.6*** 847.3*** 296.3*** 410.5*** 1582*** 1584*** 
Breusch-Pagam  
test 
Chibar2 173.99 176.49 39.64 49.80 28.98 12.55 9.25 9.31 
Prob>Chibar2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.062 0.058 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects reject the null hypothesis and conclude random effects is appropriate after Hausmann test,  






 Table 7 : Moderation effect of AAOIFI on value relevance of accounting numbers for IBs and CBs_IWs. Period:  2010-2018 
  Panel C : Sub-sample IBs Panel D : Sub-sample HBs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES  PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE 
EPS  5.24*** 5.63***   4.68*** 5.44*** 13.81*** 13.54***   0.51 -0.02 
  (1.42) (1.44)   (1.48) (1.47) (0.99) (1.00)   (1.33) (1.25) 
BVPS    0.98*** 0.99** 0.90** 0.70*   0.98*** 0.99*** 0.96*** 1.00*** 
    (0.37) (0.39) (0.37) (0.39)   (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) 
AAOIFI  2.36** 2.84*** 2.27** 2.38* 2.42** 1.71 0.86* -0.45 1.75*** 1.19** 1.73*** 0.16 
  (1.03) (1.07) (1.12) (1.25) (0.96) (1.08) (0.52) (0.73) (0.37) (0.50) (0.37) (0.51) 
EPS_AAOIFI   -15.67***    -25.15***  23.19***    48.06*** 
   (5.36)    (6.55)  (8.92)    (8.04) 
BVPS_AAOIFI     -0.27  3.52**    1.32  -2.86*** 
     (1.20)  (1.39)    (0.82)  (1.04) 
IFRS  0.64 0.81 1.05** 1.08* 1.06** 0.97* 0.92* 1.11** 0.98*** 1.03*** 0.97*** 1.29*** 
  (0.50) (0.50) (0.53) (0.56) (0.53) (0.53) (0.49) (0.50) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.35) 
SIZE  0.54*** 0.62*** 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.44** 0.53*** 0.35* 0.15 0.42*** 0.35** 0.41*** 0.05 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.22) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
PIL3  -2.05*** -2.08*** -1.85*** -1.85*** -2.04*** -2.07*** -1.46*** -1.51*** -0.77** -0.84** -0.78** -0.71** 
  (0.55) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.55) (0.54) (0.50) (0.50) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.36) 
SMC  0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.05** 0.05*** 0.00 0.01 0.02* 0.03** 0.02* 0.04*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ROA  -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.12 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.21) (0.21) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) 
LEV  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
GDP  0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.24*** 0.20*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.21*** 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
INFLT  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Constant  -4.58*** -5.25*** -5.56*** -5.60*** -4.67*** -5.11*** -4.14*** -2.47 -4.63*** -4.03*** -4.57*** -1.80 
  (1.60) (1.62) (1.62) (1.64) (1.56) (1.56) (1.60) (1.73) (1.20) (1.26) (1.22) (1.24) 
              
Observations  325 325 324 324 324 324 287 287 287 287 287 287 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2_o  0.656 0.639 0.639 0.637 0.679 0.683 0.636 0.647 0.782 0.784 0.782 0.810 
Chi2  235.2*** 229.4*** 193.6*** 189.5*** 281.5*** 293.1*** 317.4*** 311.6*** 963.2*** 971.5*** 960.3*** 1131*** 
Breusch-Pagam  
test 
Chibar2 54.64 58.37 70.38 66.85 28.92 27.77 76.79 65.35 10.21 10.5 12.11 11.21 
Pro>Chibar2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.058 0.062 0.062 






Standard errors in parentheses ;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table 2 shows the variables definitions. 
 
Table 8: Robustness models- IFRS on value relevance of accounting numbers for banks (Eq5) 
 CBs IFRS CBs No IFRS IBs IFRS IBs No IFRS HBs IFRS HBs No IFRS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES PRICE* PRICE* PRICE* PRICE* PRICE* PRICE* 
       
EPS 7.64*** 6.02*** 13.80*** 0.71 1.17 0.44 
 (1.73) (0.58) (3.22) (0.88) (1.93) (1.12) 
BVPS 0.26* 0.31*** 0.13 0.13 0.88*** 0.77*** 
 (0.15) (0.02) (0.52) (0.21) (0.10) (0.18) 
SIZE 0.41*** 0.12*** 0.64*** 0.47*** 0.36 0.18** 
 (0.12) (0.03) (0.21) (0.14) (0.29) (0.07) 
PIL3 0.70 0.81*** 0.94* 1.16*** -0.14 0.67*** 
 (0.43) (0.15) (0.54) (0.30) (0.62) (0.18) 
SMC -0.03** -0.00 -0.03 -0.03** 0.01 -0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
ROA -0.12 -0.06 -0.01 -0.13** -0.05 -0.20** 
 (0.12) (0.05) (0.11) (0.06) (0.28) (0.09) 
LEV 0.02 -0.05*** -0.02 -0.03*** 0.10*** -0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) 
GDP 0.25*** 0.13*** 0.36*** 0.14** 0.34*** 0.28*** 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) 
INFLT -0.10 0.03** -0.13 0.05** -0.02 0.04** 
 (0.09) (0.01) (0.11) (0.02) (0.14) (0.02) 
Constant -4.72*** -2.29*** -6.41*** -3.91*** -7.28*** -3.23*** 
 (0.83) (0.28) (1.40) (0.77) (2.20) (0.46) 
       
Observations 324 411 233 92 168 119 
Adjusted R2 0.411 0.643 0.427 0.264 0.701 0.645 
F 25.99*** 83.09*** 20.19*** 4.628*** 44.41*** 24.78*** 






Table 9: Robustness models- Good and Bad news value relevance (Eq 6) 
 CBs IBs HBs 
 Good News Bad News Good News Bad News Good News Bad News 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES (EPS/PRICE)* (EPS/ PRICE)* (EPS/ PRICE)* (EPS/ PRICE)* (EPS/ PRICE)* (EPS/ PRICE)* 
       
RETURN 0.25*** 0.04*** -0.02 0.06* 0.03 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
SIZE 0.04*** 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
PIL3 -0.03 -0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02* 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
SMC -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ROA 0.05*** -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.05*** 0.01** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
LEV -0.00** 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDP -0.02*** 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
INFLT 0.01 0.00 0.01*** -0.00 -0.01** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -0.38*** -0.07 -0.01 0.10 0.26** -0.04 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.04) 
       
Observations 319 219 154 91 93 103 
R-squared 0.40 0.04 0.11 0.12 0.23 0.25 
F 25.83*** 1.071*** 2.325*** 1.386*** 3.216*** 3.945*** 
Standard errors in parentheses ;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table 2 shows the variables definitions. 
 
